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The Psychology of Counterfactual Thinking 
Neal J. Roese & Mike Morrison ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Psychologie kontrafaktischen Denkens«. Counterfactual think-
ing refers to mental constructions of alternatives to past events. In this over-
view of the psychological basis of counterfactual thinking, we examine how 
such thoughts influence emotions and carry benefits for everyday behavior. 
Two psychological mechanisms, contrast effects and causal inferences, can ex-
plain many of the effects of counterfactual thinking reported by psychologists. 
We then consider how counterfactuals, when used within expository but also 
fictional narratives (for example, in alternative histories), might be persuasive 
and entertaining. 
Keywords: counterfactual thinking, causal inference effect, contrast effect. 
The Psychology of Counterfactual Thinking 
What might your life be like if you had made key choices differently? What if 
you had attended a different college, chosen a different career, married some-
one else? Most people ponder such possibilities at least once in awhile; some-
times they are haunted by the apparent failings such musings reveal. These 
sorts of thoughts are termed counterfactual, meaning that they are mental rep-
resentations of alternatives to past factual events. Psychological researchers 
have found that counterfactual thoughts play an important role in mental life, 
informing decisions, shaping emotions, and placing knowledge into context.  
According to the definition commonly agreed upon by psychologists, coun-
terfactual thoughts refer to mental representations that are explicitly contrary to 
facts or beliefs (Byrne, 2005; Epstude & Roese, 2008; Roese, 1997). Some 
aspect of perceived reality is taken as the starting point, and the counterfactual 
embodies a juxtaposition against this reality. Typically, an event that is nega-
tive or unusual (e.g., an automobile accident) triggers the process of counter-
factual thinking. The resultant counterfactual then focuses on how the event 
might have been different. Counterfactual thoughts often take the form of con-
ditional statements, embracing both an antecedent (“If only Bob had kept his 
eyes on the road”) and a consequent (“he would have avoided the accident”). In 
the typical thoughts that abound in daily life, the antecedent constitutes an 
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action or decision by an individual, and the consequent describes a state of 
being, often framed in evaluative terms (Markman & McMullen, 2003). Coun-
terfactuals can focus, therefore, on alternative outcomes that are better than 
actuality (“upward counterfactuals”) or worse than actuality (“downward coun-
terfactuals”). Psychologists are interested in counterfactual thinking because 
they seem to be intimately related to emotion, social perception, and self-
understanding. 
The exploration of counterfactuals has been initiated independently by 
scholars in diverse disciplines, including philosophy, history, economics, po-
litical science, linguistics, computer science. The study of the psychological 
basis of counterfactual thinking began in the 1970s with studies of the basic 
memory properties of counterfactual versus factual inferences (e.g., Carpenter, 
1973; Fillenbaum, 1974). A seminal paper by Kahneman and Tversky (1982) 
reframed the study of counterfactuals in terms of biased judgment and deci-
sion-making. By assessing counterfactuals within their everyday life context, 
such as consumer choice, monetary decisions, or career plans, Kahneman and 
Tversky initiated a new wave of research that has connected counterfactual 
thinking to a wide range of psychological and behavioral outcomes. For exam-
ple, counterfactual thinking has been linked to difficulty in coping with misfor-
tune, judgments of blame and responsibility, depression and anxiety symptoms, 
feelings of regret, superstitious beliefs, overconfidence regarding the predict-
ability of the past, and expectations for future occurrences (e.g., Alicke, Buck-
ingham, Zell, & Davis, 2008; Gilbar & Hevroni, 2007; Markman & Miller, 
2006; Miller & Taylor, 1995; Roese & Maniar, 1997; Roese & Olson, 1993; 
Tetlock & Lebow, 2001). 
The present paper provides a brief overview of the psychology of counter-
factual thinking, examining the determinants and consequences of such 
thoughts in daily life. We then apply these ideas to shed light on how counter-
factuals in the form of “alternative realities” are used in fiction, film, and other 
forms of narrative entertainment. As we will show, the psychological basis of 
counterfactual thinking illuminates their role as dramatic devices (Roese, 
2005).  
Some Consequences of Counterfactual Thinking 
Psychological research in the 1980s and 1990s emphasized the negative conse-
quences of counterfactual thinking. The emotion of regret is a negative feeling 
that hinges on a counterfactual inference, specifically the recognition that a 
decision, if made differently, would have resulted in a better outcome. “Up-
ward” counterfactuals, i.e., those that focus on how past events might have 
been better, can produce this feeling of regret. If an individual repeatedly 
dwells on past failings by musing on how things might have been better, the 
individual is at risk for depression and anxiety disorders (Kocovski, Endler, 
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Rector, & Flett, 2005; Markman & Miller, 2006; Monroe, Skowronski, Mac-
Donald, & Wood, 2005; Roese et al., in press). In other research, long-term 
rumination (repetitive intrusive thoughts about past events) on upward counter-
factuals was found to interfere with coping with negative life events (Davis & 
Lehman, 1995). Another form of negative consequence was biased decision-
making. After making a particular investment, for example, a decision-maker 
might see that he would be better off by 25% had he invested elsewhere. To the 
extent that this counterfactual realization produces sharply negative emotion, 
the decision-maker may be driven to make subsequent non-optimal decisions 
by re-assessing strategy and switching investments (Roese, 1999; Zeelenberg & 
Pieters, 1999). All else being equal, investors tend to “over-switch” (Barber & 
Odean, 2000), which is to say that they do not remain within a particular in-
vestment long enough to realize maximal benefit, instead incurring unnecessary 
transaction costs by switching to new investments. The counterfactual emotion 
of regret exacerbates this tendency to over-switch. 
Counterfactual thinking also influences judgments of blame and responsibil-
ity (Alicke et al., 2008). Consider the case of Harry, who is attacked late at 
night while walking near his flat. To the extent that it is easy to imagine Harry 
taking an alternative route, or staying inside and not walking at all, the result-
ing counterfactual emphasizes Harry’s decision-making role as a causal input 
into the attack. Although it is utterly clear to most observers that primary blame 
rests on the assailant and not the victim, there is nevertheless a tendency to 
blame the victim more in light of a counterfactual that “undoes” the outcome 
by focusing on how Harry’s actions might have been different. A variety of 
studies have thus connected counterfactual thoughts to blame judgments in 
criminal and other legal decision-making contexts (Alicke et al., 2008; Catel-
lani & Milesi, 2001; Macrae, 1992; Macrae, Milne, & Griffiths, 1993; Turley, 
Sanna, & Reiter, 1995). 
This brief overview of the consequences of counterfactual thinking only 
scratches the surface. Several hundred studies have demonstrated the impact of 
counterfactual thinking on a wide range of judgments, decisions, emotions, and 
behavior. These various consequences may be understood in terms of two basic 
psychological mechanisms. 
Two Mechanisms  
Two main mechanisms have been argued to underlie the majority of psycho-
logical consequences of counterfactual thinking (Epstude & Roese, 2008; 
Roese, 1997; Roese & Olson, 1995). 
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Contrast Effects  
Counterfactual thoughts may influence emotions and judgments by way of a 
contrast effect, which is based on the juxtaposition of reality versus what might 
have been. For example, winning $50 feels nice, but if one came close to win-
ning $100 instead of $50, it does not feel quite as nice. This effect of counter-
factuals on emotion and satisfaction is an example of a widely observed psy-
chological principle, that of the contrast effect. Contrast effects occur when a 
judgment is made more extreme via the juxtaposition of some anchor or stan-
dard (Sherif & Hovland, 1961). Contrast effects can apply to any sort of judg-
ment, including physical properties, such as heaviness, brightness, loudness, or 
temperature. For example, ice cream feels especially cold immediately after 
sipping hot tea. A suitcase may feel especially light if one has just been moving 
furniture. Contrast effects also apply to subjective appraisals of value, satisfac-
tion, and pleasure. Thus, by the same token, a factual outcome may be judged 
to be worse if a more desirable alternative outcome is salient, and that same 
outcome may be judged to be better if a less desirable alternative outcome is 
salient. 
This counterfactual contrast effect was vividly illustrated in a study of 
Olympic athletes and their reactions to medal-winning performances. Medvec, 
Madey, and Gilovich (1995) found that Silver medalists were less satisfied than 
were Bronze medalists. Most observes would assume that second place confers 
greater joy than third place. But in several studies, these authors showed that 
the counterfactual that “I almost came in first” is salient to the Silver medalist 
(i.e., an upward counterfactual), whereas the counterfactual that “I might have 
come in fourth and missed getting a medal” is salient to the Bronze medalist 
(i.e., a downward counterfactual). These differing counterfactuals (upward vs. 
downward) were found to influence the degree of satisfaction felt by the ath-
letes, as indicated by their facial displays of rejoicing immediately after the 
competition, and also by questionnaires in which the athletes gave ratings of 
their subjective pleasure.  
Causal Inference Effects  
Counterfactual thoughts may also imply causal inferences, which may have 
psychological consequences that are independent of contrast effects. By virtue 
of their conditional structure and implicit reference to a parallel factual state-
ment, counterfactual propositions exemplify the logic of Mill’s method of 
difference (see Mill, 1872). For example, consider the counterfactual statement 
that “If only Ellen had bought the insurance, she would not have been in such a 
dire financial situation after the fire.” This alternative scenario is implicitly 
connected to the parallel facts that Ellen did not buy insurance and that Ellen 
was in a dire financial situation. If the counterfactual world in which Ellen does 
buy insurance is identical in all other respects to factuality, then the only thing 
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that can account for the difference in financial situations between the counter-
factual world and the factual world is Ellen’s insurance decision. As a result, 
this counterfactual points to the conclusion that Ellen’s decision was a causal 
force in bringing about her financial situation. In current psychological theoriz-
ing, it is assumed that counterfactual thoughts do not create or evoke the causal 
inference, but rather that they dramatize, underscore, or illuminate a causal 
inference that is already thought by the individual to reasonably plausible (cf. 
Epstude & Roese, 2008; Spellman & Mandel, 1999). 
Via their influence on causal inferences, counterfactual thoughts may influ-
ence the blaming effects discussed in the previous section, but they may also 
underlie overconfidence in predicting the past (one may feel certain that the 
outcome of a football match was predictable in hindsight because a particular 
causal explanation, such as the role of a star player, is salient, e.g., Roese & 
Maniar, 1997). By the same token, predictions of future outcomes may also be 
influenced by this counterfactual-induced causal inference (if a football victory 
was due to the actions of the star player, then one may predict future victories 
in games featuring that same star player).  
These two mechanisms of counterfactual represent a basic, lower-level of 
conceptual analysis. At a higher-level, we may apply these ideas of mechanism 
to a broader assessment of “why” human beings generate so many counterfac-
tual thoughts. 
Functions of Counterfactual Thinking 
Counterfactual thoughts may serve important psychological functions for the 
individual (Epstude & Roese, 2008; Roese, 1997). That is, counterfactual 
thoughts may be construed not only as negative and as sources of bias. Rather, 
they may also be construed as useful or adaptive for certain purposes and under 
certain circumstances. In a functional analysis, such global benefits may ex-
plain the genesis, pervasiveness, and situational variation of counterfactual 
thinking.  
Two distinct functions of counterfactual thinking have been supported by a 
range of research. First, such thoughts may serve a preparative function; that 
is, they may illuminate means by which individuals can prepare for the future 
and, accordingly, improve their lot. Thus, if a student who failed an exam real-
izes that he would have passed if only he had studied more, he has identified a 
causally potent antecedent action that may be subsequently deployed to en-
hance future performance (Markman & McMullen, 2003; Roese, 1994; Roese 
& Olson, 1997). Second, counterfactual thoughts can serve an affective func-
tion; that is, they may be used to make oneself or another person feel better. 
This affective function relies not on any causal information, but rather on the 
contrast effect mechanism. That is, a given outcome is judged more favorably 
to the extent that a less desirable anchor is made salient (Roese, 1999). For 
 21
example, a person who experiences a negative event (e.g., an automobile acci-
dent) may console herself by thinking that the event might have been even 
worse (e.g., she might also have been seriously injured).  
These two psychological functions of counterfactual thinking help to place 
into context a wide range of effects of counterfactual thinking that have been 
observed. More specifically, several key patterns of counterfactual thinking in 
daily life are compatible with the general idea that counterfactuals can improve 
performance. First, counterfactual thoughts tend to be idealistic, in that upward 
counterfactuals outnumber downward counterfactuals. That is, people tend to 
think spontaneously about how the past could have been better rather than how 
it could have been worse (Nasco & Marsh 1999; Summerville & Roese, 2008). 
Second, counterfactual thoughts are situationally reactive, in that they are more 
likely to appear after failure than after success (Roese & Hur 1997). Third, 
counterfactual thoughts are problem-focused, in that they tend to focus on 
fixing problems and achieving goals (Roese, Hur, & Pennington, 1999). Fi-
nally, counterfactual thoughts themselves have the effect of improving per-
formance, at least under some circumstances (Markman, McMullen, & Elizaga, 
2008; Roese, 1994). 
That counterfactual thoughts help to improve performance (the preparative 
function) is consistent with recent brain imaging evidence. If counterfactual 
thinking is implicated in learning, deciding, and planning (all of which seem to 
involve neural pathways that come together in the orbitofrontal cortex of the 
brain; Kringelbach, 2005), then counterfactual thinking should also involve 
similar brain activation. Indeed, patients with damage to the orbitofrontal cor-
tex show decreased skill in counterfactual thinking, and tasks that elicit coun-
terfactual thinking involve orbitofrontal activation (Camille et al., 2004; 
Chandrasekhar, Capra, Moore, Noussair, & Berns, 2008; Fujiwara, Tobler, 
Taira, Iijima, & Tsutsui, 2008).  
This psychological basis of counterfactual thinking can be applied to an un-
derstanding of counterfactual ideas and might be more or less convincing when 
used as an argument, or when used to bolster a narrative. We turn next to a 
discussion of these ideas. 
Impact of Counterfactuals in Communications and 
Entertainment 
The psychological basis of counterfactual thinking helps to shed light on why 
some sorts of counterfactuals come across as more persuasive, more compel-
ling, and more entertaining. As discussed previously, counterfactuals can influ-
ence emotions by way of a contrast effect. Accordingly, counterfactuals may be 
used to make a narrative more stimulating (and perhaps more enjoyable) by 
way of this contrast effect mechanism. Upward counterfactuals (thinking about 
how the past might have been better) evoke negative emotions, whereas down-
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ward counterfactuals (thinking about how the past might have been worse) 
evoke positive emotions, by way of juxtaposing against reality. By skillfully 
injecting a story with counterfactuals, a storyteller may manipulate the emo-
tions of the audience with subtlety and aplomb.  
A classic example is the film It’s a Wonderful Life, in which the main char-
acter is shown what his small town (and the people in it) might have been like 
had he never been born. The vision shown to the main character is a dark and 
unpleasant vision – the town that might have been is much worse than reality, 
and many of the people’s lives that are emptier and lonelier. By drawing out 
this contrast, the main character, and the audience in turn, come to appreciate 
his actual life to a greater extent. The film ends with a joyous appreciation of 
the world as it actually is. In this example, the entire plot of the film hinges on 
a downward counterfactual. 
Counterfactuals may also be used to heighten emotion at specific points in a 
narrative. The feeling that something bad almost happened creates a momen-
tary tension, followed rapidly by a release of positive emotion when it becomes 
clear that this something bad did not happen. Winning a race, scoring a big 
promotion, getting the girl are all positive story outcomes with satisfying end-
ings that leave audiences pleased. But a race won that was nearly lost, a promo-
tion that was nearly a termination, and a girl who came so very close to falling 
in love with some other guy are all story endings with dramatic flare born of 
that feeling of “almostness,” and they leave the audience all the more satisfied.  
Creating situations in which something else almost happens is a staple of 
good storytelling. As plots unfold, forks in the road, surprising twists, and the 
overall recognition of multiple possibilities breathe life into the story. Devices 
that the author can plant to emphasize the almostness, the palpable alternative 
that nearly happened, create dramatic tension. Some are blatant, as when an 
action hero’s sidekick suffers a gruesome death (eaten by an alligator, melted 
in a vat of acid), a fate spelled out in vivid detail so as to drive home the coun-
terfactual that the very same fate nearly befell the hero. Some are only a little 
less blatant, as when the fate is not directly portrayed but rather hinted at: a vat 
of boiling acid or a pit of snakes are shown, the hero nearly falls in, but then 
does not. We see the acid or snakes, but we are left to imagine on our own how 
awful it would have been to have fallen into such places.  
Theme and Variation 
Counterfactuals may also enhance the persuasiveness and entertainment value 
of a narrative by way of their connection to the element of “theme and varia-
tion.” If reality is the theme, and counterfactual is the variation, then the juxta-
position of the two embodies a combination of the joy of recognition with 
surprise at something novel. Hofstadter (1979) argued that “the crux of creativ-
ity resides in the ability to manufacture variations on a theme” (p. 249). He 
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further argued that the ease with which ordinary people generate counterfactual 
thoughts is an example of the basic creative capacity of the human mind. In an 
important sense, artists who use variations on a theme are mimicking the natu-
ral manner in which the human brain sees the world. Brains comprehend reality 
by generating benchmarks built of past experience. When the brain sees some-
thing surprising, the experience of surprise itself comes from the mental 
benchmarks that pop to mind and reveal how things could have (or should 
have) been. Brains are continuously producing creative variations (i.e., counter-
factual elaborations of alternatives to current experiences) as we experience the 
flow of events in our lives. 
To become truly great art, theme and variation need a third companion, 
resolution. In a three-act play, three distinct sections correspond to establishing 
the setting, introducing a problem, and then presenting a solution to the prob-
lem. Like the three-act play, a “plot counterfactual” embraces a triplet struc-
ture. The theme is reality as we know it. The variation is the counterfactual, 
and contained in the counterfactual is some problem that confronts the main 
characters. The resolution is an ending that reveals some insight about the 
workings of reality that might otherwise have gone unrecognized. For example, 
in the film, It’s a Wonderful Life, the value of friendship and community is 
drawn into sharper focus by juxtaposing their factual form to a counterfactual 
alternative in which they are absent.  
A constraint on the persuasive power of a counterfactual is its degree of 
variation, or the amount of alteration to reality, that it entails. Berlyne (1974) 
demonstrated experimentally that what strikes many as good art typically in-
volves only slight deviation from expectations. Art that perfectly fits expecta-
tions is boring; art involving a great departure from the familiar strikes many as 
bizarre and repugnant. Somewhere between the extremes of the boring and the 
bizarre lays a sweet zone of recognition coupled with mild surprise. This prin-
ciple advocated by Berlyne (1974) applies to counterfactuals as well, whether 
they are used by artists to influence an audience’s emotions, or if they are used 
as persuasive arguments to convince someone of a particular point of view. A 
compelling counterfactual, one that convinces an audience that some alterna-
tive might well have happened, must follow a “minimal rewrite rule” (Tetlock 
& Belkin, 1996). Small, minor changes to reality are acceptable, whereas big-
ger changes may leave the audience baffled. As psychological research on 
counterfactual thinking has shown, the regrets with which people kick them-
selves also follow this minimal rewrite rule (Roese & Summerville, 2005). 
People typically focus on just one action to alter within the counterfactual. All 
other aspects of reality remain within the counterfactual exactly as they truly 
are. In the best stories of the alternate history genre (in which the entire story 
takes place in a counterfactual world), there are a few key differences between 
the story’s setting and reality, framed by innumerable similarities, such as the 
laws of physics and basic characteristics of human nature. Counterfactuals 
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within narratives that follow this minimal rewrite rule are, we suggest, the most 
compelling and most persuasive (Lebow, 2000; Tetlock & Belkin, 1996). 
Conclusion 
Our primary goal has been to describe some research on the psychological 
basis of counterfactual thinking. This overview emphasized a functional view 
of such thought processes, which seeks to specify what goals they serve and 
what benefits they bring for the typical individual on a daily basis. We believe 
that these factors influence not only lay perceivers, but also scholars in various 
disciplines. Accordingly, an understanding of the psychological principles 
underlying counterfactual thinking might enable scholars of history, political 
science, philosophy, and literature to structure counterfactually based argu-
ments more effectively. On the other hand, scholars might leverage their 
knowledge of psychological principles so as to create arguments that juxtapose 
against them. If cognitive biases maintain and reinforce conceptual parochial-
ism, then deliberately avoiding such cognitive constraints may facilitate the 
realization of more creative, novel, and insightful analyses.  
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